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CHALLENGES OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
CONFLICTS: A LOOK AT DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
JAMIE A. WILLIAMSON*
During times of armed conflict, whether characterized as international
or non-international, International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) is applicable.
As a body of law, IHL does not question the lawfulness of a conflict (jus ad
bellum) but seeks instead to apply humanitarian principles in warfare (jus
in bello). IHL recognizes that even war has its limits, irrespective of its
cause, and strives to establish humanitarian parameters to the means and
methods of warfare and to alleviate the suffering that conflict so often
causes to persons not taking part in the hostilities. The core IHL
instruments are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, their two Additional
Protocols of 1977, and Additional Protocol III of 2005. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) has been entrusted by states that are
parties to the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols,1 and

* Legal Advisor for the International Committee of the Red Cross Regional Delegation for the
United States and Canada. The views and opinions expressed in this article are mine alone and do not
necessarily reflect those of the ICRC.
1. For instance, Articles 9, 9, 9 and 10 respectively of the four Geneva Conventions provide that
“the present Convention constitute[s] no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International
Committee of the Red Cross . . . may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned,
undertake for the protection of the wounded and sick, medical personnel and chaplains, and for their
relief.” Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field art. 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea art. 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 9, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 10, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. Article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions reads, “An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.” Geneva Convention I, supra note 1, art. 3;
Geneva Convention II, supra note 1, art. 3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 1, art. 3; Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 1, art. 3. Article 126 of the Third Geneva Convention and Article 143 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention recognize that the ICRC has permission to go to all places where protected
persons may be, in particular those deprived of liberty, have access to all premises occupied by them,
interview them without witnesses, and have full liberty to select the places of visit as well as the
duration and frequency of the visits. The ICRC’s mission is to protect and assist the civilian and
military victims of armed conflicts and internal disturbances on a strictly neutral and impartial basis and
to promote compliance with IHL. The ICRC’s global presence is adjusted to respond to armed conflicts
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through the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement (“Statutes”),2 with the “guardianship” of IHL.
Tracing the history of the development of International Humanitarian
Law during the twentieth century, it could be argued that IHL evolved to
address new humanitarian concerns arising from the then existing conflicts.
Thus after the Second World War, we saw states calling for greater
protection of civilians during armed conflicts and an extension of the
earlier Conventions to better address concerns relative to wounded and sick
in armed forces in the field and at sea, and to prisoners of war. The addition
of Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions marked an important
step forward in that, even in non-international armed conflicts, a minimum
of protections would be ensured for persons taking no part in hostilities or
those who are hors de combat.
Similarly, with the adoption of the two additional Protocols in 1977,
more than a quarter of a century later, states sought to deal with aspects of
human suffering not covered by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Provisions
on the conduct of hostilities and of combatants, traditionally found within
the “Law of the Hague,” were included.3 Additional Protocol II represented
the first international instrument dedicated to the protection of victims of
non-international armed conflicts. With the Geneva Conventions having
been ratified universally and the 1977 Additional Protocols ratified by the
vast majority of states, the international community has voiced its
commitment to the principles contained in these instruments and to
respecting and ensuring the respect of IHL.4

and other situations of violence; it currently has offices in 80 countries with over 12,000 staff
worldwide. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE ICRC: ITS MISSION AND WORK 3-5 (2009), http://
www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0963/$File/ICRC_002_0963.PDF.
2. The Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement were adopted by the
25th International Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in October 1986 and as amended in 1995 and
2006. Statutes of the Int’l Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, http://www.icrc.org/Web/
eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/statutes-movement-220506/$File/Statutes-EN-A5.pdf (last visited May 19,
2010).
3. The “Law of The Hague” establishes the rights and obligations of belligerents in the conduct
of military operations and limits the means of harming the adversary. JENNIFER ELSEA, CRS REP. FOR
CONG., TERRORISM AND THE LAW OF WAR: TRYING TERRORISTS AS WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2001), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31191.pdf. It includes the 1899 Hague
Conventions respecting the laws and customs of war on land and the adaptation to maritime warfare and
the principles of the 1864 Geneva Convention, as well as the 1907 Review of the Hague Conventions of
1899 and adoption of new Conventions. Id.
4. At the time of writing, the Geneva Conventions have been universally ratified, and 164 States
have ratified Additional Protocol I; 168 have ratified Additional Protocol II; and 40 have ratified
Additional Protocol III. ICRC.org, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/
siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions (last visited Mar. 22, 2010).
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However, in recent times, armed conflicts have given rise to new
challenges and to new humanitarian concerns. The realities of modern day
armed conflicts have also fuelled the debate as to the adequacy of IHL in
the face of an evolving tapestry of conflict.
Indeed, it could be argued that starting in the early 1990s, there has
been a notable shift away from the manner in which conflicts were
traditionally fought, with new actors, new weapons and new tactics.
Contemporary armed conflicts are vastly different creatures from those
prevailing in the first part of the twentieth century, when states negotiated
the texts of the Geneva Conventions. Gone are the days when the
belligerents were often easily recognizable and were predominantly
members of the regular armed forces of the states confronting one another,
as was the case during the First and Second World Wars. Those actively
engaged in the fighting then were usually soldiers who stood apart from
civilians, and civilians were not seen to be taking any direct part in the
hostilities. Combatants would wear military uniforms and carry their
weapons openly.
Presently, most armed conflicts are not fought between states in such a
traditional fashion. A wide range of highly complex and drawn-out internal
conflicts of low intensity are replacing interstate warfare.5 Most conflicts
usually involve at least one organized non-state armed group, without a
clear start or end to the hostilities. Questions of transnational terrorism
further add fuel to the fire of violence. Indeed, over the past decade we
have witnessed the advent of the so-called global fight against terrorism,
also referred to as the global war against al Qaeda and its affiliates.
With this metamorphosis of conflicts, it was suggested that certain
aspects of IHL were inadequate to deal with the realities of modern
warfare.6 IHL was deemed too outdated to effectively address the threats
faced in the fight against terrorism.7 Thus for instance, much was written

5. For example, see the complex situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Darfur
region of Sudan.
6. See, e.g., John H. Richardson, Alberto Gonzalez: What I’ve Learned, ESQUIRE, Dec. 9, 2009
(quoting former Attorney General Gonzalez: “I used the word quaint in referring to provisions in the
Geneva Conventions that require the signatories to provide the prisoners of war privileges like
commissary privileges, scientific instruments, athletic uniforms. I think those provisions are quaint. I
did not say nor did I intend to say that the basic principles of the Geneva Conventions in providing for
humane treatment were quaint. So if I had to do it again, what I would not do is use the word quaint and
the Geneva Conventions in the same sentence.”); Ronald Watson, Geneva Accords Quaint and
Obsolete, Legal Aide Told Bush, TIMESONLINE, May 19, 2004, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
news/world/iraq/article426900.ece (last visited Mar. 22, 2010).
7. See, e.g., Al Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Brown, J., concurring)
(“War is a challenge to law, and the law must adjust. It must recognize that the old wineskins of
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about the sufficiency of IHL to tackle the transnational threat posed by
terrorism. For the ICRC, there was no one size fits all approach to
answering this question. Each situation of violence, whether part of the so
called global fight against terrorism or not, needs to be assessed on a caseby-case basis. In other words, only by looking at the facts on the ground, at
the parties involved, and nature of the violence, could it be determined
whether and to what extent IHL applied to the situation. Individuals at war
in the legal sense would be protected by International Humanitarian Law.
Outside of legal war, protection would be afforded by other bodies of law,
such as human rights law and domestic law.8
I. SOME CLARIFICATION PROCESSES
Seeking to address some of the challenges posed to IHL by
contemporary armed conflicts, in 2003, the ICRC presented a report to the
28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, intended
to generate reflection and debate about some of the issues.9 In the view of
the ICRC, the four Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, other IHL
treaties, as well as norms of international customary law, provided a
bedrock of principles and rules that must continue to guide the conduct of
hostilities and the treatment of persons who have fallen into the hands of a
party to an armed conflict.10 In 2007, the ICRC explained further that this
body of law “reflect[s] a reasonable and pragmatic balance between the
demands of military necessity and those of humanity.”11 For the ICRC, the
challenges to IHL were not to be resolved through development of IHL per
se, but rather through clarification and further elaboration of the rules and
principles contained in this body of law.
The ICRC identified a number of issues raised by modern-day armed
conflicts that warranted possible further clarification. These included
procedural principles and safeguards for internment or administrative

international law, domestic criminal procedure, or other prior frameworks are ill-suited to the bitter
wine of this new warfare.”).
8. See Jakob Kellenberger, Challenges Faced by the ICRC and Int’l Humanitarian Law (IHL),
available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/kellenberger-statement-191006) (last visited
Mar. 22, 2010). Jakob Kellenberger was the President of the ICRC at Georgetown University in
Washington, D.C. Id.
9. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS (2003), http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5TALFN/$File/Reaf%20and%20dev-Main%20report-Oct%202003.pdf.
10. Id.
11. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
THE CHALLENGES OF ARMED CONFLICTS 4 (2007), http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/
ihl-30-international-conference-101207/$File/IHL-challenges-30th-International-Conference-ENG.pdf.
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detention, particularly in connection with the fight against terrorism, the
regulation of private military and security companies, increasing the
respect for IHL and the role of sanctions. They also covered aspects of the
conduct of hostilities, including the use of certain weapons such as cluster
munitions, direct participation in hostilities and the protection of persons in
the midst of non-international armed conflicts.12
This process of clarification is a work in progress, though there have
already been certain notable outcomes. In 2005, the ICRC issued a set of
procedural principles and safeguards applicable to any situation of
internment. These have been relied upon by the ICRC in its operational
dialogue with detaining authorities in a number of contexts.13
In 2008, as the outcome of an initiative launched cooperatively by the
Government of Switzerland and the ICRC, the Montreux Document on
Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States
Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During
Armed Conflict was published.14
Also in 2008, the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted by
107 states at a diplomatic conference held in Dublin, Ireland, and opened
for signature on December 3, 2008 at a treaty signing ceremony in Oslo,

12. Id.
13. See Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative
Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 858 at 379
(2005), quoting International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 1057 U.N.T.S. 407.
14. Letter, General Assembly Security Council, Status of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc.
A/63/467–S/2008/636 (Oct. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Montreux Document]. The document was developed
with the participation of governmental experts from Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada,
China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ukraine, and the United States of America in meetings
convened in January and November 2006, November 2007, and April and September 2008. A number
of representatives of civil society, NGOs, and of the private military and security industry were
consulted as part of the process. There are currently 34 states that support the Montreux Document.
Seventeen states jointly finalized the document on the occasion of a concluding meeting in Montreux,
Switzerland, on September 17, 2008. The following additional states have joined the Montreux
Document since its release, with date of communication of support: Macedonia (Feb. 3, 2009), Ecuador
(Feb. 12, 2009), Albania (Feb. 17, 2009), the Netherlands (Feb. 20, 2009), Bosnia and Herzegowina
(Mar. 9, 2009), Greece (Mar. 13, 2009), Portugal (Mar. 27, 2009), Chile (Apr. 6, 2009), Uruguay (Apr.
22, 2009), Liechtenstein (Apr. 27, 2009), Qatar (Apr. 30, 2009), Jordan (May 18, 2009), Spain (May 20,
2009), Italy (June 15, 2009), Uganda (July 23, 2009), Cyprus (Sept. 29, 2009), Georgia (Oct. 22, 2009).
Participating States of the Montreux Document, http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/
intla/humlaw/pse/parsta.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).

WILLIAMSON_JCI_1.DOC

462

6/11/2010 3:27:53 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 20:457

Norway. To date, it has been ratified by 32 states, and it will enter into
force on August 1, 2010.15
More recently, in May 2009, the ICRC issued its Interpretive
Guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law (the “Guidance”).
To be sure, the realization of each of these outcomes has not been
without debate and some interesting exchanges. However, given the
complexity of contemporary armed conflicts, this discussion is to be
expected. The more contentious area, and the more troubling from a
humanitarian perspective, relates to the loss of protection of civilians who
directly participated in hostilities.
II. DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
Under IHL, parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between
civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants,
and cannot be directed against civilians.16 However, civilians can lose their
protection from direct attack when and “for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities.”17 The immunity from direct attack to which civilians are
entitled is one of the lynchpins of IHL. Civilians do not lose their immunity
for mere contribution to the general war effort, usually carried out far from
the battlefield. However, their protection is granted subject to their

15. The Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of
Cluster Munitions. It is the result of the “Oslo-process” which was launched in February 2007, when
forty-six States agreed to the Oslo Declaration which reads: “Conclude by 2008 a legally binding
international instrument that prohibits the use and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause
unacceptable harm to civilians and secure adequate provision of care and rehabilitation to survivors and
clearance of contaminated areas.” Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, Declaration, Feb. 22-23,
2007, available at http://www.clusterconvention.org/downloadablefiles/Oslo%20DeclarationFeb07.pdf.
16. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 48, 51(1) and 52(2), June 8, 1977
[hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 13(2), June 8, 1977 [hereinafter
Protocol II]. See also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME I: RULES 8-11 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005)
[hereinafter HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK]; see also JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, INT’L
AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPT., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 16 (2009) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL
LAW HANDBOOK] (“Sometimes referred to as the principle of discrimination, this principle requires that
combatants be distinguished from non combatants, and that military objectives be distinguished from
protected property or protected places. In keeping with this ‘grandfather’ principle of the [Law of War],
parties to a conflict must direct their operations only against combatants and military objectives.”)
17. Protocol I, supra note 16, art. 15(3); Protocol II, supra note 16, art. 13(3). See also
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 16, at 19-24.
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abstention from all direct participation in hostilities during armed conflicts.
Failure to do so leaves them open to direct attack.18
With the changing nature of warfare though, there has been not only
increased civilian involvement in acts closely related to actual combat, but
also a lessening distinction between civilians and belligerents, especially on
the side of non-state actors involved in non-international armed conflicts.
With this blurring of actors, determining who is a lawful target becomes a
much more complex assessment for the parties to the conflict. This blurring
also puts civilians at greater risk of being in harm’s way during the
hostilities.
The Guidance, an institutional publication of the ICRC, represented
the outcome of an expert process conducted from 2003 to 2008. The ICRC
held several meetings during this period which brought together nearly 50
legal experts from academic, military, governmental, and nongovernmental circles, all of whom attended in their personal capacity.19 The
Guidance is influenced by the expert discussions, but does not necessarily
reflect a majority opinion of the participating experts on the various issues
addressed.20
As explained in its introduction, the Guidance interprets the notion of
direct participation in hostilities for the purposes of the conduct of
hostilities only.21 In other words, the Guidance focuses on whether and for
how long a person is considered to have lost protection from direct attack
because he or she is directly participating in hostilities. The Guidance does
not look at what happens to an individual after he has directly participated
in hostilities, and for instance finds himself detained by the adversary.
The Guidance presents ten recommendations, from defining who is a
civilian in armed conflicts to explaining that which constitutes direct
participation in hostilities and the consequence of so participating. Without
18. JEAN PICTET ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 §§ 1942-1945 (1987) [hereinafter PICTET COMMENTARY].
19. All materials produced in the course of the expert process are available at www.icrc.org.
20. As explained in the Introduction to the Guidance: “The Interpretive Guidance is widely
informed by the discussions held during these expert meetings but does not necessarily reflect a
unanimous view or majority opinion of the experts. It endeavours to propose a balanced and practical
solution that takes into account the wide variety of concerns involved and, at the same time, ensures a
clear and coherent interpretation of the law consistent with the purposes and principles of IHL.
Ultimately, the responsibility for the Interpretive Guidance is assumed by the ICRC as a neutral and
independent humanitarian organization mandated by the international community of States to promote
and work for a better understanding of IHL.” INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 9-10 (2009) [hereinafter GUIDANCE], available at http://
www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0990/$File/ICRC_002_0990.PDF.
21. Id. at 10-11.
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seeking to be comprehensive, the following is an overview of the
recommendations and of some of the questions that arose during the expert
process.
The first recommendation defines civilians in international armed
conflict as being “all persons who are neither members of the armed forces
of a party to the conflict nor participants in a levée en masse.”22 Similarly,
in the context of non-international armed conflicts, the second
recommendation states that civilians are “all persons who are not members
of State armed forces or organized armed groups of a party to the conflict
and are therefore entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”23
The Guidance explains that in non-international armed conflicts,
organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-state party to
the conflict and consist only of individuals whose constant function is to
take a direct part in hostilities, or, in other words, individuals who have a
continuous combat function. This functional, rather than membership,
approach takes into the account the reality of structures and membership of
irregularly constituted groups, where membership is rarely formal or made
obvious through the wearing of uniforms or fixed insignia. As such, the
Guidance notes that other factors should be taken into account. Repeated
direct participation in hostilities, for instance, may be an indicator of
having a continuous combat function. In case of doubt, the individual must
be considered a civilian entitled to protection from direct attack.
Individuals accompanying and supporting such organized groups and
whose functions do not involve direct participation in hostilities remain
civilians, and are not subject to direct attack. Examples of such civilians
include recruiters, trainers, and financiers, as well as purchasers and
smugglers of equipment. Of course, by virtue of accompanying the
organised armed groups, they may be at greater risk of being in harm’s way
during hostilities. Nonetheless, as with other civilians, they remain
protected from “direct attack unless and for such time as they directly
participate in hostilities.”24
In the same vein, recommendation three states that private contractors
and civilian “employees of a party to an armed conflict who are

22. Id. at 20. Members of a levée en masse are “[i]nhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on
the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had
time to form themselves into regular armed units provided that they carry arms openly and respect the
laws and customs of war.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(6),
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
23. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 27.
24. Id. at 34-35.
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civilians . . . are entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”25 However, their
activities and presence alongside the armed forces and military objectives
may expose them to an increased risk of incidental death or injury.26
This reading of the status of personnel of Private Military and Security
Companies (“PMSCs”) reflects the conclusion of the Montreux Document
on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States
Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During
Armed Conflict.27 According to the Montreux Document, the status of the
personnel of private security and military contractors in armed conflict
situations is to be determined by International Humanitarian Law on a caseby-case basis, with particular regard to the nature and circumstances of the
functions in which they are involved. However, there is a presumption that
personnel of PMSCs are protected as civilians under IHL unless they are
incorporated into the regular armed forces of a state or are members of
organized armed forces, groups or units under a command responsible to
the state. As with other civilians under IHL, personnel of PMSCs may not
be the object of attack, unless and for such time as they directly participate
in hostilities.
Recommendations four, five, and six look specifically at the nature of
the acts that could constitute direct participation in hostilities and seek to
provide temporal as well as geographical outer limits to specific acts. The
fourth recommendation sets the standard, by explaining that the “[n]otion
of direct participation in hostilities refers to specific acts carried out by
individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed
conflict.”28 Recommendation five of the Guidance then advances
cumulative criteria to be met for an act to qualify as direct participation in
hostilities, termed as (i) threshold of harm, (ii) direct causation, and (iii)
belligerent nexus. First, “the act must be likely to adversely affect the
military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or,
alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects
protected against direct attack.”29 Second, “there must be a direct causal
link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or
from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an
integral part.”30 And third, “the act must be specifically designed to directly
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
See Montreux Document, supra note 14.
GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 43-45.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 51.
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cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict
and to the detriment of another.”31
Finally, recommendation six provides guidance as to the beginning
and end of an act said to constitute direct participation in hostilities by
stipulating that “measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act of
direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and the
return from the location of its execution, constitute an integral part of that
act.”32
During discussions on the direct causation criteria, experts were
careful to draw a distinction between direct participation in hostilities and
indirect participation—notably, assisting the general war effort and war
sustaining activities. While some forms of indirect participation may
adversely affect the military effort of a party to the conflict, according to
the Guidance, indirect participation does not entail the loss of protection
from direct attack.33
This distinction between acts merely building the military capacity of
one of the parties to the conflict and those acts intended to actually cause
harm was discussed during the experts meetings.34 According to this
distinction, a civilian worker in an ammunitions factory is not directly
participating in hostilities, but merely supporting the general war effort.
Unlike the civilian who actually uses the ammunition to harm the
adversary, the factory worker has not lost his protection under IHL and is
not subject to direct attack. Other examples of indirect forms of
participation that were cited include design, production, and shipment of
weapons and military equipment, recruitment and training of personnel,
and political propaganda. The experts felt that whether an act had
“sufficient” causal link to qualify as direct participation in hostilities could
not be objectively measured, and had to be assessed on a case-by-case
basis.35

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 58.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 54-56.
See, e.g., INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE THIRD EXPERT
MEETING ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES (2005), available at http://
www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-article-020709/$File/2005-09-reportdph-2005-icrc.pdf.
35. For a similar approach, see The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, UK Ministry of
Defence (Oxford University Press 2004), at 5.3.3: Whether civilians are taking a direct part in hostilities
is a question of fact. Civilians manning an anti-aircraft gun or engaging in sabotage of military
installations are doing so. Civilians working in military vehicle maintenance depots or munitions
factories or driving military transport vehicles are not, but they are at risk from attacks on those
objectives since military objectives may be attacked whether or not civilians are present.
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It was also indicated by experts that the direct causation standard
should not be equated with a “but for” test or with “aiding and abetting,”
given that both of these would include activities which the experts agreed
would be indirect rather than direct participation.36 Indeed, the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”) has described direct participation in hostilities as “acts of war
which by their nature or purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the
personnel or equipment of the enemy’s armed forces. Such an enquiry must
be undertaken on a case-by-case basis . . . .”37
Recommendations six and seven delve into the temporal parameters of
direct participation in hostilities. Recommendation six was discussed in
part above. Recommendation seven states that
[c]ivilians lose protection against direct attack for the duration of each
specific act amounting to direct participation in hostilities, whereas
members of organized armed groups belonging to a non-state party to
an armed conflict cease to be civilians and lose protection against
direct attack for as long as they assume their continuous combat
function.38

The scope of the loss of protection, both in terms of the integral elements of
each specific act, as well in relation to civilians who participate in
hostilities in a recurrent manner, was one of the more difficult issues to be
analyzed. IHL indicates that civilians can be the subject of attack “for such
time” as they directly participate in hostilities, and that they regain
protection thereafter. As explained in the commentary to Additional
Protocol I, “[i]f a civilian participates directly in hostilities, it is clear that
he will not enjoy any protection against attacks for as long as his
participation lasts. Thereafter, as he no longer presents any danger for the
adversary, he may not be attacked.”39 During the experts’ meetings there
was much discussion on the parameters of the beginning and end of direct
participation for each act. This also gave rise to the consideration of the
‘revolving door’ concept, whereby civilians lose protection only for such
time as they engage in direct participation in hostilities.40

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 34.
Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, ICTY, § 178 (17 July 2008).
GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 70-73.
PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 18, § 4789.
See, e.g., INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE FIFTH EXPERT
MEETING ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 33-44 (2008) [hereinafter 2008
Report], available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-article020709/$File/2008-05-report-dph-2008-icrc.pdf.

WILLIAMSON_JCI_1.DOC

468

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

6/11/2010 3:27:53 PM

[Vol 20:457

The first question in essence then, is when does direct participation
effectively start and end? Can it be said that direct participation is limited
to the actual execution of the hostile act itself, for instance the actual laying
and detonating of the Improvised Explosive Device (“IED”), or does it also
include the build up to the act of direct participation, for instance
assembling the IED in a garage for use the next day, as well the
deployment to and return from the location of the act?
The Guidance recognizes that civilians can be subject to attack when
undertaking preparatory measures to the execution of the act, deploying to
the location and returning from the location of the execution of the act.
Preparatory acts are simply described with reference to Article 44(3) of
Additional Protocol I, as acts which are of a specifically military nature and
so closely linked to the subsequent execution of the hostile act that they
already constitute an integral part of that act.41 The discussions of the
experts demonstrated the challenge in coming up with a workable standard
and timeframe. It was recognized that utmost care was needed in making
the determinations, balancing the humanitarian consequence of subjecting
an individual to direct attack against the need for the military to attack
during preparatory phases, seeing that this could be the only opportunity to
deter and defeat a lethal attack.42
In terms of deployment to the act, the Guidance indicates that, where a
specific act requires prior geographic deployment, the deployment is
considered an integral part of the act in question to the extent that the
physical displacement is undertaken with a view to carry out a specific
operation.43
Concerning the end of the act, according to the Guidance, an
individual is no longer directly participating in hostilities when he has
physically separated from the operation, notably by laying down his
weapons and resuming activities distinct from that operation.44 As with
preparatory acts, the experts agreed that utmost care had to be taken, as
well as situational pragmatism exercised, when deciding whether a civilian
had effectively “returned” and regained protection from direct attack. To
engage such civilians long after their withdrawal, when they no longer
posed a threat, could be viewed as coming close to punishment. On the

41. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 65-67.
42. INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE FOURTH EXPERT MEETING
ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 60-61 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 REPORT],
available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-article-020709/$File/
2006-03-report-dph-2006-icrc.pdf.
43. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 67.
44. Id. at 67-68.
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other hand, expecting armed forces not to attack individuals who had
directly participated in hostilities as soon as they started withdrawing from
the location, could give rise to other operational and humanitarian
concerns, especially in guerrilla warfare situations with increased risks to
civilians.45
To recap, a civilian loses protection when and for such time as he
directly participates in hostilities. After the commission of the act,
protection from direct attack is restored. What if the civilian’s engagement
is not a solitary incident? Does the civilian regain protection between each
engagement, only to lose it when actual direct participation is occurring, or
is the civilian subject to direct attacks even during the interval periods? The
Guidance explains that unlike members of organized armed groups who
lose protection for as long as they assume a continuous combat function,
the loss of protection of civilians who directly participate in hostilities is
only temporarily suspended, and not continuous.46 Circumstances in the
battlefield are complex and ever changing. As such, even if a civilian has
repeatedly participated in hostilities, future conduct is likely to be difficult
to anticipate. Of course, if an individual repeatedly and in an organized
manner, rather than sporadically and spontaneously, directly participates in
hostilities, it could be argued that his behaviour is more akin to someone
with a continuous combat function, such as a member of an organized
armed group.47
For a number of experts, this “revolving door” concept was
problematic.48 It was suggested that it was operationally untenable to argue
that civilians could “‘opt in’ and ‘opt out’ of the conduct of hostilities,”
especially if they were to participate not just once, but twice or thrice.49 For
these experts, such repeated engagement represented “a ‘continuous mode’
of direct participation in hostilities.”50 An example given of such
continuous engagement was the “civilian who fired at a military convoy
from a hiding position and who then returned home just to conceal his
weapon and wait for the next occasion to ambush a convoy.”51

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

2006 Report, supra note 42, at 61-63.
GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 70.
Id. at 71.
2008 Report, supra note 40, at 36.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38.
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With the concept of hostile intent included in the rules of engagement
of a number of armed forces, such viewpoints arguably muster weight.52
Indeed, operationally, soldiers might be endangered were they to wait for a
civilian, who has on a number of previous occasions directly participated in
hostilities, to commit another hostile act before engaging. Yet, on the other
hand, it may be that the civilian is no longer a threat, for instance because
he was previously forced by insurgents to participate in hostilities, and
therefore should be entitled to protection. Recognizing these difficult
operational realities, the Guidance underscores the need to protect civilians
from erroneous or arbitrary attacks.
Given that an individual directly participating in hostilities is subject
to direct attack, possibly through the use of lethal force, recommendations
eight and nine speak to the precautions that must be taken before and
during the attacks and to the restraints that must be exercised during the use
of force.53 As such, all feasible precautions must be taken in determining
whether a person is a civilian and, if so, whether that civilian is directly
participating in hostilities. “[F]easible precautions are understood to be
those that are practicable or practically possible taking all the
circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military
precautions.”54 In case of doubt, the person must be presumed to be
protected against direct attack. Feasible precautions as to whether a civilian
is directly participating in hostilities are to be taken not only before the
launching of an attack, but also during the attack, so that it can be
suspended if it appears that the civilian is in fact entitled to protection.55
Recommendation nine also notes that, “[i]n addition to the restraints
imposed by international humanitarian law on specific means and methods
of warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions that may arise
under other applicable branches of international law, the kind and degree of
force which is permissible against persons [who are] not entitled to
protection against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary
to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing
circumstances.”56 The reports of the experts’ meetings reflect the extensive
discussions that surrounded the inclusion of this recommendation and its

52. Hostile intent is defined as “the threat of imminent use of force against the United States, US
forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes the threat of force to preclude or impede
the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property.”
See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 75.
53. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 74-82.
54. 2006 Report, supra note 42, at 69.
55. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 74.
56. Id. at 77.
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legal basis.57 In including the recommendation, the ICRC explained notably
that “it would defy basic notions of humanity to kill an adversary or to
refrain from giving him an opportunity to surrender where there is
manifestly no necessity for the use of lethal force.”58
Finally, recommendation ten explains the loss of protection from
direct attack is temporary, to the extent that it is linked to when the
individual is directly participating in hostilities or to his or her continuous
combat function in an organized armed group.59 When civilians cease to
directly participate in hostilities, or when members of organized armed
groups belonging to a non-state party to an armed conflict cease to assume
their continuous combat function, they regain full civilian protection
against direct attack, but they are not exempted from prosecution for
violations of domestic and international law they may have committed.
As indicated above, the Guidance reflects the ICRC’s position of how
existing law should be interpreted and is not an attempt to change existing
rules of customary and treaty IHL. The many views expressed by the
experts during the various meetings highlighted the myriad difficulties of
trying to address this delicate as well as emotive aspect of IHL: the
mingling of belligerents amongst the civilian population increases the risk
of erroneous targeting of civilians, but also makes the task of military
personnel that much more difficult as they operate in hostile and complex
environments.
CONCLUSION
A greater presence of non-state actors in contemporary armed
conflicts has given risen to new humanitarian concerns regarding the
protection of civilians and has created new challenges to ensuring the
respect of IHL. In the fog of modern wars, finding the right balance
between humanity and military necessity can be difficult, but it is essential
to do so if the suffering and destruction caused by war are to be limited.

57. See 2008 Report, supra note 40, at 7-32.
58. GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 82.
59. Id. at 83-85.

